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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Dimensions of this report 
The farm price proposals have become an annual fixture for which 
the Parliament has a set procedure. However, this year, there is a 
difference. Following the Commission's Green Paper (1) on the future of 
the Agriculture Policy, as well as the Memoranda on the 
Adjustment of the Market Organization for cereals (2)J beef (3), the 
Memorandum on the Future of Agriculture <4>, and the proposals for 
other commodities, the farm price proposals (5) must now be seen in the 
context of wider measures which are proposed as interdependent and 
complementary. Your rapporteur believes that in the light of these 
developments, it would be sensible to draw up this explanatory statement 
in two parts - the first part concerning the overall direction and 
policy relating to agricultural price supports, and the second making 
specific recommendations on farm prices and related measures. It is 
only by setting these specific measures in the context of an agreed 
policy covering a number of years that a coherent CAP will emerge. It 
is essential that the Parliament should take a medium-term view. 
2. Parliament's role 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
In the preparation of this explanatory statement your rapporteur has 
consulted over 60 organizations, including producer and consumer organiza-
tions, academic bodies, FAO, the World Food Council and other Community 
institutions (6). The rapporteur hopes to reflect the views of the majority 
of the Parliament. 
The CAP has reached a level of public awareness where it is necess-
ary. to face up to the criticisms made of it by the majority of Europe's 
voters. There is a need to seek real and lasting solutions to those 
COM(85) 333 final 
COM(85) 700 final 
COM(85) 834 final 
COM(85) 750 final 
COM(86) 20 final 
A full list is given in the Annex 
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criticisms within the context of the CAP's objectives and within the 
meaning of Article 39 of the Treaty in particular. Where necessary, 
Parliament will need to take a freshapproach to the difficulties facing 
the CAP, which may lead to the adoption of new policies in certain 
important fields <although it is unrealistic to hope for a consensus in all 
areas). 
In this regard it will simply not be enough for Parliament to 
make a vague, general policy statement, totally divorced from the policy 
decisions that need to be taken, and then leave it to the Commission and 
especially the Council of Ministers to fight it out over the detailed 
legislation. It is by leaving all the detailed decisions to the Council 
to make in isolation from the wishes of the majority of voters in the 
Community that has led to the CAP being confronted by the difficulties 
that it presently faces. 
SECTION I 
AGRICULTURE IN THE COMMUNITY 
3. The perspective 
The CAP actually absorbs a small part of the Community's 
GOP <less than 1%), which is no more than in other developed countries, 
notably the USA, but at the same time directly affects over 3% of the 
Ccmn.nity's pcpJlation, which is substantially more than in the USA where only 1.5% of the popr 
lation is directly involved in agriculture. When the agricultural input 
and equipment industries and the agricultural and food processing indus-
tries are also taken into account, agriculture is by far the Community's 
largest and most important industry. In relation to that the cost of 
the CAP is modest. Unlike any other industry or economic activity, 
agriculture, and notably its output performance, is only determined 
in part by human activity, with a substantial contribution made by 
factors like weather that are beyond human control. 
However; the CAP attracts widespread public criticism for wasting valuable 
resources, both natural and financial. At the same time, agriculture 
needs public and political support if it is to prosper. Criticism of 
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the CAP is a major factor undermining the Community as a whole and 
holding back progress towards further European integration. There 
are other priority policy areas, of which the most important is un-
employment. The fact that many millions of Community citizens are 
living in poverty, the slow progress of technological development, 
social problems such a~ urban decay which leads to a breakdown in 
law and order, regional disparities and the loss of economic, and 
especially industrial, competitiveness are other vital issues. 
By cutting out surplus production, the Community could do more 
to alleviate these other priority areas. We can thus convince a wider 
section of the population of the Community's direct relevance to them. 
It is not a question of undermining agriculture; it is a question of 
improving the effectiveness of the Community's agricultural policy and 
therefore its public image. 
Surpluses are diverting vital financial resources from 
sectors which are now more essential for economic progress of 
the Community. At the same time, agriculture as a resource remains 
one of the Community's economic assets and we cannot afford to allow 
it to be undermined. 
4. Priorities for the future 
It is clear that different.interests and different Member States have 
different priorities. However, the approach adopted by the Council of 
reaching consensus by offering something to everyone has 4ndermined the 
reforms called for by the Commission and Parliament. This does not provide 
any real solutions to the real problems. The CAP has performed magnificently 
in meeting the tasks originally set, notably in increasing self-sufficiency 
in a number of key agricultural products. But many of these tasks are no 
longer relevant to our present-day needs. 
In essence, the objectives must be restated to meet these needs. 
It has to be recognized that farmers in the Community will continue to 
require support and funding. Agricultural policy aimed only at the 
most technically efficient result, would end up with an 
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agronomyconsisting of large and efficient farms, but based on mono-
culture. This would result in the wholesale abandonment of the Land, and 
of entire rural areas, as small and medium-sized family farmers 
would be unable to compete. This is the draw-back of drastic 'price 
cuts' which would cause the complete "desertification" of vast tracts 
of the Community and it is totally unacceptable, socially, politically 
and economically. 
The question to be resolved, therefore, is how can agricultural 
production in the Community be brought under control without destroying 
the rural economy. 
The Commission's Green Paper foresaw either price cuts or the 
extension of the "empire of quotas". This is to approach 
the problem from the wrong end. It tries to cure the symptoms rather 
than the disease. It is also to approach the wrong problem, or rather it 
ignores the real problem which is excessive market intervention. !Jtat is needed 
is less Commission intervention in the market; not more. 
The Commission's approach, which the Council broadly follows, 
offers no fundamental reorientation of the CAP; it just provides yet 
another series of palliatives and expedients to give the world the 
impression that something is being done, when in fact nothing is actually 
being resolved for the longer term. 
Farmers only produce because it is financially necessary or 
worth their while to do so. A prudent price policy, if continued nver 
a number of years, would reduce production. But the consequence of 
small and medium-sized farmers being put out of business, would result 
in greater costs to the national exchequers than the budgetary savings 
to the CAP. An enormous burden to already over-stretched social security 
budgets would ensue. If these new unemployed were to gain useful employ-
ment, it would necessitate a substantial fall in wages and real standards 
of living in the rest of the economy. Neither of these effects would be 
tolerable for government or taxpayers. 
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What the Commission has failed to do in its Green Paper and in 
its current proposals is to set out a genuine policy for the long-term 
future of the CAP. Indeed, it has refused to re-examine any of t~e 
basic assumptions on which the present policy is based. 
It is clear that we must re-define our objectives and this 
report must be seen as a first step in this direction. 
However, the Commission's proposed package of measures consisting 
essentially of price restraintr the introduction of new coresponsibility 
levies, a number of new or refined market intervention measures and a 
series of new spending proposals does not go far in the direction of 
restoring the balance in supply and demand nor of tight budgetary 
control. 
In order to balance the market it is not sufficient merely to 
alleviate the budgetary cost of the imbalance by raising new levies 
on farmers and farm production in order to pay for the mistakes of the 
past. To restore market equilibrium, it is necessary only to re-establish 
proper balance between intervention and the functioning of market forces. 
It certainly does not require~ intervention in the market. Quotas 
or levies will exacerbate, not alleviate, the problem. Proper balance 
means intervening in the market only where strictly necessary. 
5. · Arti~res 38-47 of the Treaty of Rome - Are they understood? 
The classic argument is that under Article 39, we have to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural Community, particularly by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged-in agriculture. 
This argument fails to note that this is dependent on the previous 
paragraph of the Article,which states quite clearly that one of the aims 
of the policy shall be to increase agricultural productivity and ensure 
the development of agriculture through the optimum utilisation of the 
facto~ of production. It is therefore clearly stated in the Treaty 
that incomes can only ri~e as a result of-increases in agricultural 
productivity. 
- 6 - PE 102.544/fin. 
While there has been much dispute about the consistency of the 
objectives, there is no sound economic argument for concluding that 
increased productivity, stabilized markets, availability of supplies 
and reasonable consumer prices cannot be compatible with each other. 
The disequilibria that presently afflict agricultural production and 
consumption in the Community result from the failure to adhere to 
this guiding principle in the practical implementation of the Treaty. 
Excessive emphasis has been placed on the interventionist instruments 
provided for in the Treaty, but thesewere never intended to pay for 
continuous production of surpluses. They were mainly intended to compensate 
for regional and structural disparities. 
6. The price mechanism 
The main reason for the overemphasis on intervention in the agricul-
tural market has been the absence of suitable alternatives to the agricul-
tural price mechanism. The price mechanism has been used as the agricul-
tural policy instrument, almost to the exclusionof all other policy measures. 
This is illustrated by the fact that, for the 1984 budget year, guidance 
section expenditure accounted for only 5% of the total CAP budget; 95% was 
spent on price support. Clearly, however, adjustment of the price mechanism 
will have to be carried through gradually and will demand complementary 
measures. 
The guidance sector is the proper instrument for adjusting regional 
and structural disparities. This fund should represent at Least 25% of 
CAP expenditure. 
In order to succeed in restoring the balance in supply and demand in 
the medium-term without provoking undue disturbance to farmers, the readjust-
ment of the price mechanism must take place within the context of an agreed 
and established strategy for agriculture. The strategy should be agreed 
for the Longer term. Such a strategy could consist either of a three-year 
rolling price-mechanism, or, if this were too rigid, could be price targets. 
In whatever form, once established, the strategy must be binding on the 
Council for its duration. 
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However, a price policy is not sufficient on its own to restore 
the balance. The Commission agrees with this in its Memorandum on 
"A Future for Community Agriculture". The present system of interven-
tion actively discourages producers from being responsible for the dis-
posal of their own produce, effectively isolating them from market forces, 
and Leads to the problems on the international market. This severely 
damages the Community budget and also undermines the fragile development 
of agriculture in the world's poorest and Least developed countries. 
Farmers must be involved with, not isolated from, the market. Exports, 
particularly to developing countries, must be co-ordinated so as not 
to damage the importing countries' rural economy. 
7. Intervention ceilings 
Whilst accepting the Commission's restrictions in cereal inter-
vention, a further alternative could be the establishment of inter-
vention ceilings. 
Although the precise mechanism for restricting intervention 
will vary in accordance with the product concerned, a restrictive 
intervention policy should be based on the introduction of an inter-
vention ceiling, which could evolve around a "standard quantity". 
They should be established for each of the relevant products, notably 
those in surplus. They should operate in a manner similar to the inter-
vention system for bread making quality wheat (see, for example, 
Regulation 1810/84) (7). Thus, intervention would be available for a 
fixed quantity of produce meeting the quality requirements at a known 
annual budgetary cost. 
In the event of excess offers being made to intervention agencies, 
preference could be given to smaller producers providing that this were 
done in a way that conforms with Article 40.3 of the Treaty. Therefore 
it would be up to the trader of grain to dispose of any excess in any 
manner he wishes. This approach would be particularly appropriate to 
the cereals sector, where, as seen above, it already operates in a 
Limited way. An intervention ceiling should also involve a Limit on 
the cost of refunds. 
(7) Doc. B-1280/85, OJ L170 of 29.6.84 
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These principles are enshrined in Parliament's Resolution on 
the disposal of agricultural stocks adopted on 13 December 1985. 
8. Complementary measures 
More emphasis will have to be placed on complementary measures 
if the CAP is to perform its alloted tasks adequately. However, where 
complementary measures involve additional costs to the budget, they can 
only be introduced when the Community's budgetary resources permit. 
Otherwise, protecting agriculture from indiscriminate budget-cutters 
who only want a cheaper agricultural policy, not a better one, will 
become an ever more difficult task. 
The following examples of complementary measures are not intended 
to be exhaustive, and they are not treated comprehensively. Some of 
these issues have been the subject of specific treatment in the 
Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Food <such as in the working 
document by FRUH (0) on alternative crops and the discussion led by MOUCHEL 
on alternative uses) and it is not for a report on prices to go into 
detail on such matters~ However, these examples are given to provide 
a framework for the consolidation and reinforcement of rural policy, 
in addition to the re-adjustment of agricultural pricing policy, which 
is to have a viable and vigorous agricultural industry for the remainder 
of this century and at the same time assist the rural population. 
9. ,Farm incomes 
The most important area for complementary measures is in the 
area of farm incomes. The opportunity to increase earnings has only 
been realized by the stronger and more efficient farms. Incomes, 
particularly among small and medium-sized farms, have been in decline. 
This has affected smaller farmers in the Less favoured rural areas 
most seriously, precisely those areas where continuation of activity 
is most vital. 
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Direct income support specifically tailored to a specific need 
is much more effective for sm~Ller farmers for whom the sup~orts 
are primarily intended. 
Research carried out in Ireland in 1984 by An Foras Taluntais 
estimated that in 1977 the value of CAP support averaged£ 2,144 per 
family farm worker in County Cork where average incomes were£ 6,140, 
whereas in Donegal the average was £ 270, where average incomes were 
only £ 1,735. This is clearly unjust. There is Little reason to 
suppose that this situation is much different in other Less favoured 
regions of the Community. It thus appears that CAP price supports, 
as presently conducted, tend to perpetuate inequality by supporting 
and reinforcing structural differences which already exist. This is 
exactly contrary to the requirement of Articles 39.2 and 42(a) of 
the Treaty of Rome. 
The only way to rectify these imbalances, without destabilizing 
the markets contrary to Article 39.1(c) of the Treaty, is to introduce 
certain direct income support measures. 
The Commission went some way towards recognizing this both 
in its communication of 29 July 1983 (9) and its Green Paper of 15 July 1985 
where it suggests several options: a pre-pension for farmers, structu-
ral grants, social income benefits and buying :out schemes, These sug-
gestions tended to involve substantial additional budgetary expenditure 
and have not received an especially warm welcome. 
Further measures that the rapporteur suggests for consideration: 
a) direct income supplements: as and when budgetary resources become 
available, a more generalized system of direct income supplements 
could be considered to stem a large scale haemorrhage of the rural 
economies especially of the Less favoured areas. One of our aims 
must be to raise income Levels in the poorest regions. It has been 
estimated that 216,000 farmers in the very poorest regions of the 
EC-10 could receive an income boost of 13% by a direct grant costing 
130 mECU, averaging 585 Ecu per farmer. 
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(9) COM(83)500 
b) a disaster relief fund: this should be a fund set up at Community 
Level and operated, probably by national authorities or authorized 
independent authorities, in accordance with strict common rules, 
to assist farmers in the event of severe income Loss, caused by a 
disaster; such a scheme would probably have to feature a minimum 
Loss thresholdp below which the applicant would not be eligible 
for assistance. 
c:) an agricultural income insurance scheme: .such a scheme could be 
operated in a number of ways, from totally privately funded to 
partially publicly funded; in the Latter case, some form of 
Community guara~te~ would hav~~~ be provided to encourage insurance 
firms to offer such policies.' Certain commo~ rules would have to be 
Laid down at Community Level. 
d)a Community agricultural Loan guarantee scheme: such a scheme would 
be intended to provide short-term, zero- or Low-interest Loans 
(perhaps related to farm size) for the purpose of assisting farmers 
in overcoming current financial burdens caused by a disaster. The 
Loan would not be available for capital investment projects. Such a 
scheme should not be expensive, but a small commitment might have 
to be entered into the budget to offset bad debts. 
e) a hardship grant: another sche~e would be to provid~ a jointly financed 
grant by the Community and the Member States for small farmers. 
The grant would be provided according to common rules by the 
national authorities, which would be reimbursed in part from 
Community funds. In terms of the Community budget, such a system 
would be an effective and efficient means of farm income support. 
The Member States could thus offset such payments with savings in 
their social security payments. 
As an example, if such a scheme made assistance available to all 
those with Less than 70% of the average agricultural income (based 
on the Commission's figures for the EC-10), with a 50% Community 
cmtribUtiai, there WC)Jld be sane 2.5 mill im famers who would benefit at a cost of 
around 2,000 million Ecu to the Community budget. This would provide 
a payment to each farmer of 1,600 Ecu. Is it not worth saving this 
sum within the CAP budget to assist those in greatest need? 
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10. Promoting the rural economy 
Rural incomes can also be supported by indirect means which 
have, as their primary function, the improvement or readjustment of 
agricultural production. The main thrust of these indirect measures 
must be to establish the framework for the future of a flourishing 
agricultural sector which will contribute to the revitalisation of 
the overall rural economy. Agricultural production in the future 
must be more oriented towards producing the raw materials for the 
non-food sectors of the economy. Community expenditure must be 
directed towards investing in the future, not paying for the past. 
The aim should be to make the rural economy competitive with the 
urban economy so as to attract employment to the countryside. This 
calls for integrated programmes and integrated measures. 
Your rapporteur suggests that the main priorities should be 
given to the following sectors. 
a) Forestry: a major priority must be the reafforestation of 
marginal Land. The Community imports around 50% of its timber 
requirements. Such a Level of import dependence is a signifi-
cant drain on the Community's economy. Putting marginal Land 
under timber will both reduce the overall Level of production 
of other, notably surplus, products and increase the overall 
productivity of these crops. However, to make afforestation 
profitable for the farmer, a substantial Level of in~entives 
will be required from Community funds. Support for timber need 
not to be any more expensive than support for other products 
presently receiving EAGGF assistance. Proposals will also have 
to be made for encouraging Large scale forestry in traditional 
temperate areas. 
b) Structural policy: much greater emphasis needs to be put on 
structural measures, especially with the accession of Spain and 
Portugal. Structural inadequacies are the predominant factor 
causing regional disparities. Parliament must insist on at Least 
25% of EAGGF expenditure being devoted to structural measures. 
These measures must be aimed at boosting the entire rural economy. 
PE 102.544/fin. 
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Farmers only thrive in a flourishing economy. Particular attention 
must be paid to developing integrated programmes. The coordination 
of all the Community's structural funds must lead to the establish-
ment of a rural develo~ment fund, thus promoting the expansion of 
the total ruraleconomy. Basic infrastructure is required to 
attract high technology industries to the rural areas. At the 
same time, the Commission must take a much tougher line on stamping 
out national aids which undermine Community policy. It must make 
much greater use of instruments like Article 101 of the Treaty 
to prevent distortions to competition and trade caused by national 
measures. 
c} Agriculture and the environment 
Farmers have always been the custodians of the rural environment. 
However, there is growing concern about modern farming practices. 
It is essential for the Community to encourage farmers to adopt 
environmentally acceptable techniques. For agriculture to 
prosper, a healthy environment must be preserved. The Commission 
must therefore support the improvement of the environment. 
It should also be recognized that European agriculture can contribute 
to improving the world's environment: by maximizing the use of our 
annually renewable resources we can prevent irreparable damage 
to developing countries' ecologies. 
d) Training and research 
Rural employment can be increased by coordinating and increasing 
training in rural areas, notably in the services sector. Diversifica-
tion from agriculture requires training in new technologies, notably 
those using agricultural products. Training to improve quality 
standards can assist the marketing of agri-food products. Consumer 
demand for healthy products must be met and research to this end 
must be encouraged. Coordinated research is necessary to develop 
new technologies in the agri-food sector. 
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(e) New technologies 
New technologies are revolutionizing agricultural inputs. 
If the CAP does not adapt to these, agriculture will be Left behind 
by the rest of society and by our international competitors. These 
developments are Leading to the introduction of new crops and varieties 
which will encourage the replacement of surplus products. This is 
important for crops in which the Community is deficient. 
New technologies will also revolutionize agricultural output. 
This is Leading to the development of new uses for traditional crops 
Like cereals and sugar. Exciting possibilities are being opened up 
by the development of techniques such as whole crop harvesting of 
cereals,, Leading to new industrial uses. This development alone could 
Lead to a substantial increase in rural employment, and to increased 
profitability for farmers, but only if the raw materials are available 
at realistic prices. New industry will not invest on a foundation of 
unpredictable subsidies. 
11. Development aid 
It is absurd that in a world with an estimated 365 million tonnes 
of agricultural stocks, hundreds of millions of people are afflicted 
by hunger. The FAO predict that food aid will be required for at 
Least another 20 years. Until developing countries are self-sufficient, 
food and development aid must be co-ordinated to prevent starvation 
and to develop their indigeneous agricultural production. <10) 
(10) A statement on food aid requirements by the Director-General of 
The Food and Agricultural Organization <FAO) is contained in the Annex. 
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SECTION II 
THE 1986/87 PRICE PROPOSALS AND RELATED MEASURES 
12. The market and budgetary context 
It is abundantly clear that the 1986/87 price proposals are being 
made in the context of an acute crisis. 
The CAP, in 1986 and 1987, is facing its most ominous challenge yet, 
with severely depressed Community and international markets, and 
impending budgetary 'Armageddon'. Furthermore, real farm incomes are 
declining, severely affecting small farmers. 
The market situation is dominated by the extremely high level of 
stocks of certain important products, notably cereals, dairy, beef and 
veal, wine and olive oil. These stocks cause a double drain on the CAP: 
they depress prices, forcing more produce into intervention, and they 
bleed the budget. There are presently some 17 million tonnes of cereals 
in intervention. While this is only a small proportion of recent 
Community production, the stock is nonetheless worth around 
3,300 million Ecu. It would be extremely costly to dispose of these 
stocks (more than 1,700 million Ecu in present conditions) even supposing 
outlets could be found at current world market prices. 
The situation is even more serious for butter, as the Community's 
stocks represent over 140% of annual world trade. The cost of disposing 
of these stocks, even if the world market situation permitted it, would be 
at least 3,000 million Ecu. 
Surplus wine production accounted for 30% of total annual production 
prior to enlargement. Wine based alcohol now accounts for 40% of the 
total alcohol market and is the main reason for the alcohol surplus. A 
surplus of 14 million hectolitres would cost 852 million Ecu to convert 
into petrol over and above the compulsory distillation costs. 
The sheer magnitude of the budgetary problem is daunting. It is 
estimated that since 1983, 4,000 million Ecu has been saved from CAP 
expenditure as a result of various decisions that have been taken, i.e. 
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milk-quotas. However, over the same period, the value of stocks of 
agricultural produce has increased from around 2,000 million Ecu to 10,000 
million Ecu now, an increase of 8,000 million Ecu. Butter stocks of 1 
million tonnes alone cost the budget 365 million Ecu a year. That is a 
cost of 1 million Ecu per day. 
Furthermore, external factors are having a serious impact on the 
budgetary situation. The Commission already anticipates submitting a 
supplementary budget of 750 million Ecu to offset the cost to the EAGGF of 
the fall in the dollar, without allowing for any further fall. In 
addition, declining world prices increase the cost to the EAGGF of 
Community exports. The budgetary cost resulting from the fall in world 
cereal prices since the beginning of January is estimated, on the basis of 
the Community's traditional level of exports, as being in excess of 
600 million Ecu in 1986~ The Commission intends to dispose of an extra 
500 million Ecu worth of stocks onto the world market. Depending on the 
level of this stock disposal, the additional costs caused by external 
factors could be as much as 2,000 million Ecu, where the Commission has 
only allowed 750 million Ecu. 
Despite the Commission's hopes, there is a very real likelihood of 
EAGGF expenditure exceeding the 1.4% ceiling in 1987. Funds will have to 
come from somewhere if stock disposal is to be considered, and the market 
situation is to be alleviated. It is hard to see how the Commission's 
estimated savings of 385 million Ecu in 1986 and 770 million Ecu in 1987 
will be adequate to meet these commitments without drawing funds away from 
other areas of Community expenditure. 
The Community, including the Parliament, as a part of the budgetary 
authority, is faced with the drastic choice of either controlling 
agricultural expenditure or abandoning all other Community expenditure, 
notably the Social and Regional funds, to honour obligatory commitments. 
Politically, the latter choice is unacceptable to the Parliament. The 
legal proceedings that the Council has taken against Parliament were 
brought about by Parliament increasing Social and Regional Fund 
expenditure by 535 million Ecu in the 1986 Budget vote. 
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The CAP, indeed the Community, simply cannot afford to carry on like 
this. Unless this situation is brought under control very rapidly, there 
is a grave risk that there will be no Common Agricultural Policy by the 
end of the decade. We cannot allow the CAP to become a hostage of the 
Member States, and their national Parliaments in particular. But that 
will happen if we fail to keep EAGGF expenditure within the limits set by 
the budget. 
The key to the solution lies with the basic market Regulations 
themselves. The problem Parliament has always had with CAP expenditure is 
that, because it is obligatory expenditure, Parliament's budgetary powers 
are curtailed under the Treaty. The level of CAP expenditure is not 
determined by the budgetary process, but by the basic market Regulations. 
To establish Parliamentary control over obligatory expenditure, it is 
necessary to amend the basic Regulations. 
13. The Commission Proposals 
a) The main features: The Commission has proposed what it considers to 
be a package. The package consists essentially of a 
- price freeze in nominal terms <subject to a number of variations 
and green rates), 
- a number of related measures, 
- a planned but as yet unproposed de-stocking programme, 
- a planned but as yet unproposed structural package. 
The Commission package of detailed proposals is thus incomplete and 
cannot really be called a package. At the date of drafting this 
report, there is no indication from the Commission of the income 
effects on farmers or of the budgetary consequences. 
Apart from the overall price freeze, the main thrust of the 
Commission's proposals, as anticipated, is in the cereal and beef 
sectors. 
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b) Cereals: The cereals package, as expected, consists of a 
(i) restrictive price policy, 
Cii) a coresponsibility levy, 
(iii) quality improvements, and 
(iv) an adjusted intervention mechanism. 
(i) The Commission proposes a more or less across the board price 
freeze of the cereals intervention price, with the notable exception 
of durum wheat, for which the intervention price is to be cut by 
4.4%. This price cut is to be offset by an increase in the 
production aid, which is only paid in Italy, of 6.8%. It also 
proposes to abolish the reference price for the lowest quality of 
bread-making wheat. Its justification for these measures is that the 
enlarged Community is 118X self-sufficient in cereals; for durum 
wheat, this figure is 124%. The aim of the proposals on durum wheat 
is to discourage growing of durum wheat in non-traditional areas, 
while safeguarding the income of farmers in Italy. These measures 
should be seen in the light of the fact that SOX of French and 25% of 
Italian pasta is made from wheat imported from the U.S.A. 
(ii) In order to contribute to the cost of cereals disposal, the 
Commission proposes that producers should pay a 3X coresponsibility 
levy, although to meet the full costs of the eligible surplus, 
according to the Commission's calculation, the levy should be 6%. By 
exempting the first 25 tonnes marketed, the Commission hopes to be 
able to raise around 470 million Ecu from the levy. The 25 tonne 
exemption is the major plank in the Commission's 'central concern' 
for 'special measures even in the markets policy to ensure that the 
limited funds available are concentrated more on small and 
medium-sized farms'. (11) 
(iii) The Commission aims to improve the quality standards of cereals 
by abolishing the reference price and by basing intervention on wheat 
of bread-making quality. A price differential of 5% shall be applied 
to wheat not meeting this standard, as well as a 9% differential for 
barley to make it more competitive as a feed cereal. 
(11) Press Conference 5.2.86, Statement by Mr ANORIESSEN 
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(iv) The Commission aims to discourage market rigidity and sales to 
intervention by limiting intervention availability to five months of 
the year (from December 1 to April 30). 
c) Beef and veal: The Commission aims to rectify the build-up of beef 
stocks (presently 730,000 tonnes) by freezing the price, limiting 
intervention to an emergency role and by altering the premium. The 
beef premium will consist of a flat-rate grant of 20 Ecu per head of 
beef over six months old up to a maximum limit of SO head; and a 
suckler cow premium of 20 Ecu per head to which Member States may add 
a further premium of up to 25 Ecu per head. The premium will not be 
available to units with a dairy quota. The new regim~ will come into 
effect, if the Commission's proposals are accepted, on 
December 1, 1987, after a transitional phase. 
d) Fruit and vegetables: With the exception of aubergines and 
cauliflowers, which receive a price increase of 1i., the Commission 
proposes a general price freeze in the fruit and vegetable sector. 
However, for some products, the Commission proposes altering the 
price coefficients which will mean in practice cuts of 2.5% for 
citrus fruit, 5% for tomatoes and apricots and 10i. for peaches. The 
Commission hopes this will be enough to prevent the substantial 
withdrawals of recent years. 
e) Dairy products: The Commission proposes a freeze of prices to 
prevent the risk of increasing milk production. However, because of 
the increasing stocks of butter and the cost relativities between 
butter and skimmed milk powder, the Commission proposes a 4% cut in 
the butter intervention price and a 3.Si. increase in the skimmed milk 
powder intervention price. It hopes that this will encourage less 
milk to be converted into butter and more into powder. The 
co-responsibility levy is to be maintained at 2% of the milk 
guideline price and the super-levy is to be paid bi-annually. 
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f) Wine: In the context of the 1984 Dublin agreement and the serious 
structural imbalance on the wine market, the Commission proposes a 
price freeze. However, on the basis of an unchanged policy, the 
supply-demand imbalance on the wine market for the EC-12 will still 
be 22 million hl. in 1991/92. 
g) Oilseeds: The main innovation in this sector is the introduction of 
a system of standard quantities to bolster the guarantee threshold, 
and thus bring EAGGF spending under control. The Commission also 
puts forward its earlier proposal to add a 1.25 Ecu/100 kg. bonus to 
the target price for 'DO' rape. 
h) Tobacco: Although there has been a steady trend of increased tobacco 
production, the main problem has been the continued growing of 
varieties for which there is declining demand in the Community, 
notably for black tobaccos. To encourage production away from these 
varieties and towards varieties more in demand, the Commission 
proposes a range of price adjustments from a freeze for varieties 
most in demand to a cut of 6% for those least in demand. 
14. Rapporteur's Conclusions 
In the light of the above, the conclusion must be: What a feeble, 
emaciated, one-legged creature has crawled out of the woodwork! 
The proposals and related measures are feeble and emaciated because 
they do precious little to provide for the long-term viability of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, despite all the tough, brave words spoken 
since the new Commission took office. They are one-legged because they 
contain no structural measures without which there is no package. They 
contain no details of the de-stocking programme. 
The Commission has produced price proposals without the essential 
compensating measures. It plans a de-stocking programme without 
establishing where the funds will come from and with no guarantee that it 
will be a one-off measure. What kind of a package is that? 
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a) General observations 
(i) Agricultural markets: 
The proposal for a virtual freeze (and in some cases a reduction) of 
prices can in general be justified on the grounds of creating a better 
balance between supply and demand. Greater market orientation is a 
principle that Parliament strongly supports. But the Commission's 
attachment to greater market orientation is half-hearted, at best, as it 
now proposes further interference in the market. 
(ii) Budget 
The proposals state that in 1986, savings of 385 mEcu may be achieved 
and that in 1987 this figure could rise to 770 mEcu. But the Commission 
says a supplementary budget of 750 mEcu will be required for 1986. So, 
despite all the talk of savings, agricultural expenditure will in fact 
increase. Moreover, as outlined above, this is still probably an 
underestimate of the EAGGF's increasing demands. In other words, this 
package will do nothing more than maintain the status quo. On current 
trends, it is likely that spending on the CAP alone will breach the 1.4% 
ceiling in.198~ 
In budgetary terms, CAP expenditure is r1s1ng inexorably and 
catastrophically. This development is totally unacceptable and we must 
secure the future of the CAP. 
Outside the budget, the Commission is talking about a stock disposal 
programme costing up to 3,000 million Ecu, over three years. This will be 
taxpayers' money, but Parliament will not be properly consulted. The 
Commission appears to believe that it can evade Parliamentary scrutiny by 
the simple expedient of asking for money from Member States. Parliament 
should not tolerate such an attitude as we must have control of total 
European expenditure. 
If this expenditure genuinely solved the problems of excess 
production in the Community, it might be acceptable as a one-off measure. 
But nothing in the Commission's proposals so far indicates that it is 
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solving any major problems at all. It is the status quo dressed up as 
radical reform. But the Commission expects the taxpayer to meet the bill 
for the fancy dress. 
(iii) Farm incomes 
In view of the need to produce this report quickly, and given the 
lack of information from the Commission, it has not been possible to 
quantify the negative effect on farm incomes. However, farmers will 
suffer from the proposals, and since there are no compensating measures 
yet put forward by the Commission, it would be rash to assume that the 
overall income effect will be neutral. 
As seen above, the Commission pays lip service to concern about the 
small farmer. But how can a small farmer benefit positively by not having 
money taken away from him? This is hardly making 'funds available' to 
small farmers. 
Market adjustment through the price mechanism is only acceptable 
politically if it is combined with essential income supplements and other 
structural measures, as outlined in Section I. Otherwise it is not. 
(iv) Structural measures 
The Commission has not yet produced any proposals. Your rapporteur 
considers that they must include the following elements: 
- a commitment to achieve a 25:75 ratio between Guidance and Guarantee 
expenditure to be achieved within five years by a fixed increment in 
Guidance expenditure each year; 
- the development of integrated programmes for the least-favoured areas as 
a main priority; 
- enhanced coordination of all Community structural funds leading to the 
development of a Rural Fund; 
direct farm income measures to assist those in greatest need; 
special measures to encourage new crops and uses and to improve the 
environment. 
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Consideration should also be given to the establishment of a 
mechanism according to which any guarantee regime where CAP expenditure 
exceeds a certain proportion (e.g. 25%) of total market output should 
automatically trigger a structural programme in the sector. Such a system 
would assist the people directly involved and not the product concerned. 
b) Specific sectors 
Your rapporteur can recommend the positive elements in the Commission's 
proposals for Parliament's support. The proposals may be deemed broadly 
acceptable (subject to the receipt of more detailed information) where no 
comments are made. The following section concentrates on d~ficiencies in 
the proposals. 
(i) Cereals 
The proposed co-responsibility levy is the central element of the 
Commission's approach to the cereals sector. It is one Parliament must 
reject if it is to be consistent with previous decisions. 
A co-responsibility levy has not proved a disincentive to increased 
production. It is fatally flawed as a market regulating measure. It 
penalizes efficiency without assisting the structural difficulties of the 
small farmer; it reduces competitiveness, especially on the international 
market, thus reduces the European farmer's ability to export; but if it were 
clawed back on exports, it would discriminate against domestic consumersh It 
distorts the internal market and discriminates between users. It would 
exacerbate the problems of imports of cereal substitutes. The 25 tonne 
threshold is almost certainly illegal under the Treaty. Perhaps even more 
intolerable, it would be difficult to enforce and so give rise to fraud 
and 'tax-dodging'. 
But most of all, it is diametrically opposed to the market oriented 
policy that the Commission claims to espouse. A co-responsibility Levy is 
further interference in the market place; not less. 
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It is, in short, a method of raising revenue, avoiding proper 
Parliamentary control, while giving the appearance of adopting stringent 
measures. This is not acceptable. 
While fully endorsing the Commission's desire to improve quality 
standards, your Rapporteur believes a single quality standard should be 
set for admissability into intervention, with market demand establishing 
the price differential for Lower quality produce. On this basis, the 
Commission's proposal is acceptable as a first step towards this 
objective. 
Your Rapporteur first suggested the idea of restricted intervention, 
to operate as a mopping up exercise, over five years ago. He naturally 
fully endorses this element of the Commission's proposal, subject only to 
the condition that the period of access is gradually reduced to three 
months at the end of the marketing year. This will encourage traders to 
dispose of their cereals without recourse to the intervention mechanism, 
while still providing a safety net. 
The Commission has no real proposal for stemming cereal production, 
but the proposals are a step in the right direction. The guarantee 
threshold i.s the me.chanism for achieving this aim. Its only 
deficiency is that it does not apply automatically during the year in 
which the surplus is produced. The solution is the one which 
the Commission is now proposing for the oilseeds sector. That is to 
reinforce the existing mechanism whereby a standard quantity would come 
into force automatically when production exceeds an established threshold. 
There could also be a concurrent budgetary ceiling for export refunds. 
Such a system would constitute sound market and budgetary management and 
would provide farmers and traders with a predictable market framework 
within which to operate. Thus, it would Leave farmers the freedom to 
expand their production in Line with market requirements, while still 
providing a safety net for the smaller farmer. We must ensure a 
prosperous future for cereal farmers while still containing the budgetary 
cost of increasing output. 
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(ii) Beef and veal 
The Rapporteur endorses the Commission's proposals for the beef and 
veal sector on the proviso that the reduction of intervention is phased in 
gradually over a number of years to allow producers to recover from the 
disturbances to the beef and veal market caused by the introduction of 
dairy quotas. 
(iii) Fruit and vegetables 
While sharing the Commission's concern at the substantial quantities 
of certain fruit and vegetables withdrawn from the market, your Rapporteur 
rejects any effective price cuts for these products. Very often, 
withdrawals of these products are not caused by a real surplus of 
production, but rather because the variety or quality of the product grown 
is not what the market wants. To encourage the production of marketable 
high quality products, it is essential, to provide incentives to producers 
to improve the quality and marketing of their produce, and to discourage 
varieties that are not wanted in the market-place. Consequently, it is 
neither just nor efficient to penalise all producers indiscriminately. 
The cost of this will be relatively insignificant, because Mediterranean 
products generally are not provided with the comprehensive support 
mechanisms that the main northern products receive. 
(iv) Dairy products 
Your Rapporteur accepts the Commission's proposals for a price freeze 
for milk, and the adjustment to the price relativities between butter and 
skimmed milk powder. But it is important that these proposals are, and 
are seen to be, a step in the direction of restoring market balance in the 
dairy sector. As the proposed milk outgoers scheme appears to be 
suspended in the Council, it is necessary that further measures are taken 
to restore market balance. The most appropriate measures to take would be 
an all-round 3% cut in the quota. 
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(v) Wine 
While acknowledging that the Commission's room for manoeuvre is very 
restricted by the 1984 Dublin agreement, your Rapporteur is extremely 
concerned by the grave imbalance within the wine sector itself, and in the 
alcohol market. He also recognizes the structural and social difficulties 
confronting many of the Community's wine producers. Production of low 
quality wines, must be discouraged. The only medium-term solution to this 
problem is a co-ordinated programme of structural and social measures. The 
Council must take decisions on proposals now before it. 
(vi) Tobacco 
While fully endorsing the Commission's proposal for the 1986/87 
market year, your Rapporteur is convinced that a regime that requires more 
than 60% of market output in the form of CAP support to make the product 
competitive is a misconceived regime. However, Mediterranean tobacco 
producers face severe structural and social disadvantages. The only 
solution in the medium to long-term is a coordinated structural and social 
programme to convert producers to adapt production to current needs. 
(vii) MCA's 
The Commission's proposals for negative MCA's are acceptable. 
However, while the political difficulties with regard to positive MCA's 
are understandable, your Rapporteur is not convinced that concentrating 
the remaining legally binding cut to one year is really in the best 
interests of producers, and will not prove to be any more politically 
realistic than phasing them over two years. 
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STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE RAPPORTEUR, MR JAMES PROVAN, BY MR EDOUARD SAOUMA, 
Q!B;£IQB:§;~sBBb_Qf_I~;_fQQQ_B~Q_B§B!£~b!~B;_QB§B~!fBI!Q~_1fBQ2_£Q~£;B~!~§: 
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN FOOD AID PROVIDED BY THE EEC 
Emergency food aid requirements 
As a result of the African crisis, emergency cereal requirements have 
been running at exceptionally high levels. It can reasonably be hoped that 
needs will decline in the next year or two. FAO is therefore not 
recommending an increase in provisions for emergency cereal aid over the 
level attained in 1984/85. However, the experience of the recent past has 
shown that it is difficult and relatively slow for donors to make 
additional amounts of emergency aid available when there is a major crisis. 
What is needed is a stand-by arrangement, which would enable large 
allocations to be made when necessary, but which would not be drawn upon in 
an average year. Such an arrangement could be made by the European 
Economic Community, either acting alone or as part of a wider international 
agreement. One approach which has been proposed is to supplement the 
existing International Emergency Food Reserve ( IEFR), administered by the 
World Food Programme. On top of the IEFR's basic target of 500,000 tons of 
cereals, there would be an additional component of 1,500,000 tons to be 
held by donors on a st~nd-by basis as suggested above. 
Improvements in responsiveness of emergency food aid 
Advantage is taken of this opportunity to indicate a number of other 
actions that the international community, in particular the EEC, could 
undertake to achieve maximum efficiency in emergency operations to mee!= 
famine and food shortages. 
Delays in procurement and transportation of emergency food supplies can 
be considerably reduced by prepositioning of food stocks in advance of 
possible emergencies, in disaster-prone areas, or alternatively in the 
strategic locations from which grains can be forwarded expeditiously in 
times of need to areas actually stricken by disaster. The Government of 
the Netherlands is currently prepositioning a small amount of food aid 
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stocks in Rotterdam, but the EEC has not yet adopted such a policy. The 
prepositioning of stocks could also be combined with arrangements for the 
pre-shipment of food supplies to an affected country as soon as early 
signals are received regarding likely food shortages. 
The purchasing of foodstuffs in the country or region for distribution 
to emergency victims is another widely adopted technique. In this 
connection triangular transactions, to which the Community is already 
making an important contribution, continue to merit particular 
consideration when surpluses· are not available for purchase within an 
affected country. 
At the country or regional level the EEC could consider increasing its 
technical and financial support for the establishment and improvement of 
national and regional early warning systems, mainly in those countries 
where the food situation is more precarious and data collection less 
reliable. Greater participation in multi-donor missions to assess needs 
would also enhance ability to respond expeditiously to emergency. 
Finally, the African crisis has shown yet again the importance of 
overcoming bottlenecks in transportation of relief supplies to remote 
areas. While improvisation will probably always be needed, the EEC could 
set up permanent arrangements of a "fire brigade" nature, so that resources 
of equipment, expertise and finance can be mobilized at short notice when 
required. 
Non-emergency food aid requirements 
Apart from the impact of natural disaster and man-made emergencies, 
there are strong indications that much of Africa is going to have serious 
difficulties in securing its food supplies in coming years. The extremely 
high rates of population growth and urbanization are outrunning feasible 
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increases in domestic food production, even if policies and priorities are 
changed in favour of agriculture. Poor export prospects for many countries 
can hardly encourage optimism regarding their capacity to finance rapidly 
mounting food imports. 
The structural food deficit which results will have to be met - in a 
proportion that can be expected to vary from year to year and from country 
to country by food aid. While not emergency aid in the customary sense 
of the term, such assistance has a quasi-emergency character: failure to 
provide it is likely to result in widespread suffering, particularly in 
urban areas. The forward planning of the European Economic Community could 
provide for a substantial amount of aid to be available to meet such 
requirements. The food provided would either be sold through commercial 
channels, with the counterpart funds so generated being used for 
development purposes, or else distributed free through special feeding 
programmes to target groups. Arrangements could be made with individual 
countries on a multi-year basis, and might be associated with assistance 
for developing domestic food production. 
Studies made by FAO and the World Food Programme show that food aid. 
needs for developing countries as a whole can be expected to approach 20 
million tons of cereals per year - double the level of the recent past. Of 
this, on average 3 million tons per year would be needed to meet emergency 
needs, with the remainder required to meet stuctural deficits. The dangers 
of discouraging local food production are fully rec.ognized, and must be 
guarded against. However, evaluations have shown that, if it is well 
administered, food aid can lead to production increases rather than to the 
depression of domestic agriculture. In fact, the extremely low prices of 
cereals which now prevail on international markets are much more insidious 
in dissuading governments of low-income food-deficit countries from making 
the efforts and sacrifices needed to revolutionise their agriculture. 
Developmental food aid needs to be integrated with the recipient 
country's overall development programmes and policies. When this is done, 
it offers many opportunities for strengthening the various aspects of food 
security: achieving optimum levels of production; bringing about greater 
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stability in the flow of food supplies to the points of need; and securing 
better access to food on the part of the most deprived population groups. 
A positive approach to the planning and management of food aid 
resources is also necessa1y on the part of donors if food aid is to be a 
more efficient istr~rrt{ for food security. In particular, multi-year 
commitments ar~ /fndfspensable for the effective utilization of food aid as 
part of a Pfackage of development resources. Multi-year programming enables 
food aid to be closely tailored not only to the food security objectives of 
the recipients, but also to its wider development aims. An assurance of 
food aid supply over several years also gives the recipient country 
flexibility in mobilizing the essential complementary resources. 
Higher multi-year food aid commitments from the European Economic 
Community could be handled bilaterally, or multilaterally through the World 
Food Programme. Resource shortages are compelling the WFP to cut back its 
project commitments: consequently, there is going to be substantial 
absorptive capacity both in the Programme itself and in recipient 
countries~ The pledging target for the biennium 1987-88 has not yet been 
set, but the CotBunity could contribute even more generously than in the 
past once the figure has been established. 
Conclusion 
There is room for further upward movement in levels of food aid: for 
stand-by purposes in coping with emergencies and for filling the highly 
dangerous structural food deficits which are appearing in Africa while 
simultaneously supporting development projects and programmes. 
Nevertheless, food aid should be conceived as a way of solving the problems 
of its recipients, not the problems of the donors. The present state of 
agricultural policies in the European Economic Community offers an 
opportunity for increased generosity towards low-income food-deficit 
countries, but there can be no reasonable expectation that food aid can 
avoid the necessity of policy measures to reduce surplus production. 
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LIST OF ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED 
Producer Organisations: 
COPA 
CComite des Organisation Professionelles Agricoles de La CEE) 
COGECA 
(Comite General de La Cooperation Agricole de La CEE> 
FIPA 
(Federation Internationale des Producteurs AgricoLes> 
ASSILEC (also ASFALEC and ASSIFONTE) 
(Association de l'Industrie Latiere de La CEE) 
CCPF 
(Central Committee of the Forest Ownership in the EEC) 
CAOBISCO 
<Association of Sugar Products Industries of the EEC) 
CLITRAVI 
ANNEX U 
(Centre de liaison des industries transformatrices de viandes de La CEE) 
EUROMAISIERS 
Liaison Committee of Rice Starch Manufacture of the EEC 
Wood Industries Committee of the EEC 
EUROMALT 
<Working Committee of the EC Malting Industry> 
Groupement des Associations Meunieres des Pays de La CEE 
Liaison Committee of the EEC Food and Processing Industries 
UNECOLAIT 
(Union Europeenne du Commerce Laitier> 
CECPA 
<Euro Centre for Trade in Starch Products and Derivatives) 
AGNIB 
<Association of National Trade Groups Wood and Derived Products in countries 
of the EEO 
CIMO 
(Confederation of Importers and Marketing Organisations in Europe of Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetables) 
Union Europeene du Commerce de Gros en Fruits et Legumes 
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COCERAL 
<Committee of the Cereals and Animal Feed Trade of the EEC) 
Committee of the EEC for Industry and Trade in Wines, Aromatic Wines, 
Sparkling Wines and Liqueurs 
ASSUC 
(Association des Organisations Professionelles du Commerce des Sucres pour les 
pays de La CEE) 
EUCOLAIT 
(European Union for Trade in Milk and Derived Products) 
European Spirit Trade 
CMC Engrais 
Comite Marche Commun de l'Industrie 
(Common Market Committee of the Nitrogeneous and Phosphatic Fertiliser 
Industry) 
FEFAC 
(federation Europeenne des Fabricants d'aliments composes pour animaux) 
GEFAP 
<Euro Group of the National Association of Pesticide Manufacture) 
CIAA 
(Confederation of the Food and Drinks Industries of the EEC) 
UNICE 
(Commission of the Agriculture and Food Industries of the EEC) 
Grain and Feed Trade Association 
Bacon and Meat Manufacturers Association 
Food and Drink Federation 
UKASTA 
(United Kingdom Agricultural Suppliers Trade Association) 
UK Association of Frozen Food Producers 
Syndicat de l'Industrie Chimique Organique de Synthese et de La Biochimie 
Consu•er organisations: 
BEUC 
(Bureau Europeenne des Unions des Consommateurs) 
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Organisations representing people in agriculture: 
EFA 
(European Federation of Agricultural Workers within the Community) 
CEJA 
(Conseil Europeenne des Jeunes Agriculteurs) 
NFU 
(National Farmers Union) 
National Farmers Union of Scotland 
Scottish Landowners Federation 
COFACE 
(Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Community) 
Country Landowners Association 
Develop•ent organisations: 
FAO 
(food and Agriculture Organisation) 
WFC 
(World Food Council) 
IFAD/FIDA 
(International Fund for Agricultural Development) 
OXFAM 
Academic and other organisations: 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Rural Forum 
Institute of Development Studies 
Centre for European Agricultural Studies 
Wye Colege 
CLEO 
(Centrum voor Landbouw Economisch Onderzoek) 
INRA 
<Institut National de La Recherche Agronomique) 
An Foras Taluntais 
(The Agricultural Institute) 
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Institute Sperimentale per La Cerealicoltura 
Bundesforschungsanstalt fur Landwirtschaft 
I , 0 f I 
ASG 
Agrarsoziale Gesellschaft 
Landbouwhogeschool 
Countryside Commission 
Institute for European Environmental Policy 
Council for the Protection of Rural England 
Internationales Institut fur Umwelt und Gesellschaft 
Centre d'information sur l'environnement 
ASBL 
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Ernahrungsindustrie e.v. 
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Motion for a Resolution (Doc. B 2-395/85) 
tabled by Mr Musso 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on clementine prices 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to the Commission's farm price proposals, 
ANNEX III 
B. having regard to the proposal to lower fruit, vegetable and especially 
citrus fruit prices, 
C. whereas the Community is not self-sufficient in clementines and has 
not arranged for this variety of citrus fruit to be withdrawn from the 
market, 
1. Requests that clementines should not be included in the list of fruits 
subject to price reductions; 
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission • 
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ANNEX IV 
Motion for a Resolution <Doc. B 2-893/85> 
tabled by Mr Happart, Mrs Van Hemeldonck, Mr Remacle and Mr Glinne 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Proce~ure 
on measures applicable in the cherry-grow1ng sector 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to the treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
in particular Articles 42 and 43 thereof, 
B. whereas fruit and vegetable production is an important source of income 
for farmers, 
c. whereas imports of cherries from third countries have considerably 
hindered the aarketing of fresh cherries produced in the Community, 
D. having regard to the high quantity of stocks in the Community, 
E. whereas under these circumstances the Community market is under threat, 
which puts the survival of many farms in jeopardy, 
F. whereas the import and placing on the market of processed cherries at a 
price below the reference price is extremely disturbing for Belgian 
farmers and leads to distortion of the market, 
I. Requests: 
(a) that the sensitive nature of European production be taken into account 
and Liaits be set on the quantities of preserved cherries imported 
from third countries, at Least in the period preceding the cherry 
harvest in the Member States; 
(b) that an intra-Community system of surveillance be set up as a matter 
of urgency, to ensure that the Limits are observed over the whole 
range of products, be they cherries or products derived therefrom; 
(c) that a balance be achieved between supply and demand, at a fair price 
for farmers and promoting specialization within the Community; 
(d) that com~ercial relations on the basis of fair competition be made 
easier; 
(e) that sanctions be imposed to combat any infringements; 
II. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and 
the Council of the European Communities. 
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Motion for a Resolution 
tabled by Mr Staes 
ANNEX V 
pursuant to Rule-47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on an independent definition of the fat and protein content of milk that would 
be applicable in all Community Member States 
A. whereas at present-there are no uniform Eurcpean standards defining 
the fat and protein content of milk on an independent basis, 
B. whereas the fat and protein content determi~es the price the milk 
. producer receives for his- milk,. 
~.-,; ..•. ·,. } r . . 
c. wherea~ in a number of Community Member States ma~y- dairies define the -
fat and protein content themselves, which makes all sorts of abuses 
possible and places producers in an extremely uncertain and dependent 
position, with the result that in the present circumstances arbitrary 
decisions cannot be excluded, . 
o. whereas agricultural organizations have for years been calling for the 
fat and protein content to be~~efined independently, 
E. whereas the agricultural policy is of great importance in the Community 
~-in general and for milk production in particular, 
F. whereas the present almost chaotic situation works largely in the interests 
of the dairy industry and not of the producer or the consumer, 
G. whereas the common agricultural policy is based not only on guaranteeing 
minimum prices for the producer but also on J~feguarding low prices and 
sufficient quality for the consumer, 
H. whereas in this connection the independent definition of fat and protein 
content is of great importance and the present situation is not conducive 
to the achievement of the Commun~ty's agricultural objectives as stated 
in.recital G, 
1. whereas this problem cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it concerns 
what is a strictly commercial relationship between the dairy industry and 
the producer, particularly as the entire common agricultural policy 
frequently intervenes in the commercial. relations between agricultural · 
industries and the producer, 
J. whereas this matter affects Community farmers' livelihood, and whereas the 
data required to safeguard employment in the agricultural industry are 
elementary, 
'1. Decides that an in9ependent definition of the fat and protein content of 
milk must be estab~ished at European level, to be valid in all Community 
Member States; 
2. Instruct~ its President to direct the Commissioner responsible fo~ the 
common agricultural policy to take the necessary measures as a matter of 
urgency. 
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Motion for a Resolution <Doc. B 2-1358/85> 
tabled by Mr Howell 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the EEC cereal market 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX VI 
A ~ deeply concerned that the agricultural industries of the European 
Community face growing dangers and difficulties, 
B- concerned particularly that the cereal sector, the very basis of the 
industry as a whole, faces a growing crisis of confidence, 
C -whereas there is an apparent inability for the Council of Ministers to 
take meaningful decisions to rectify the situation in the cereal sector, 
D- recognising that .the Council has still to formally accept the 1.8X cut 
in cereal prices imposed by the Commission in respect to the 1984/1985 
price proposals, 
E- deeply concerned that the agricultural industry has lost all confidence 
in the Commission's ability to control the agricultural industry, 
F - particularly aware that the cereal sector supply situation must be 
controlled and a better balance achieved avoiding the production of 
structural surpluses beyond the demands of domestic and international 
marketjng possibility, 
G -deeply concerned by the Commission's latest proposals on the creation of 
a co-responsibility levy which are transparently political in attempting 
to create a two-tier price structure, and are certain to fail as an 
instrument in reducing supplies from farmers, 
H - convinced that the price-cutting mechanism will in the short term 
significantly increase supplies of grain to the mark~t, 
I -convinced further that such a mechanism will work in the long term by 
forcing many farmers into bankruptcy, thereby removing productive land 
from the arable acreage, 
J - utterl~ convinced that such a rule would have devastating effects on 
the economy of the countryside and will be unacceptable to the citizens 
of the European Community, 
Calls on the Commission 
1. To reject the 'price-cutting' mechanism to reduce cereal supplies; 
2. To reject any para-fiscal tax mechanism, which is transparently a 
selective 'price cut• such as the proposed co-responsibility tax; 
3. To bring forward a system of voluntary direct grants to be awarded 
to any farmer who VQlunteers to take cereal acreage out of production; 
4. To set the grant at a level of approximately 200 ECU/a year/a hectare, 
index linked; 
5. To require such land offered to be planted to appropriate woodland; 
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6. -Thereby to seek to remove 10 million hectares from the arable 
acreage of the European Community, 
Thereby returning the market in cereals to a balance that will 
require no Community finance to maintain, 
- Thereby recreating a new employment base in the countryside, 
- Thereby laying the foundations for a new timber industry for the 
next century and removing a balance of payment deficit in timber, 
- Thereby recreating a new environment in the countryside for the 
enjoyment of the European citizen and as a habitat for the 
Communities' wild life structure~ 
7. To produce such proposals with a minimum of delay so that a new 
confidence and stability can return to the countryside, the cost 
to the Community tax-payer be significantly reduced, and a new 
investment in the future of the countryside be made. 
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Motion for a Resolution (Doc. B 2-1543/85> 
tabled by Mr Boutos 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules ~f.P~ocedure 
on the imposition of a correspons1b1l1ty levy on maize 
ANNEX VII 
A. having regard to Article 3 of Regulation 2727/75 which provides for the 
fixing of a guarantee threshold for cereals other than durum w~eat, 
B. whereas the agricultUral incomes policy is founded on a prices 
policy based on modern methods of production, 
C. having regard to the structural agricultural surpluses and the resulting bJrden 
on the budget, notably as regards the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, 
D. having regard to the Commission memorandum to the Council on the 
adjustment of the market organized for cereals <COM<85> 700 final>, 
which proposes that a coresponsibility levy be imposed on cereals sold 
on the market or to intervention, with a derogation in respect of the 
first 25 tonnes delivered by each grower, 
E. whereas maize accounts for only 15% of total cereal production which 
totalled 528 m tonnes for the four-year period from 1981-1984 and 
the Community of the Ten were only 79% self-sufficient in maize, 
F. whereas maize accounts for 58.4% of total cereal imports from third 
countries but only approximately 3.7% of total cereal exports 
(imports= 47.2 m and exports = 88.7 m tonnes for the four-year 
period from 1981-1984>, 
G. whereas the coefficients of market prices for maize in the various 
producting countries fluctuated on the basis of the intervention 
price in 1984-1985 as follows: France: 1.10, Italy: 1.20, 
Greece: 1.14, 
H. whereas following the third enlargement, the Community will only 
be 66% self-sufficient (compared with 79% for the Ten> owing to 
the considerable underproduction of maize in Spain and Portugal 
<33% and 42% self-sufficient respectively), 
I. whereas maize constitutes a negligible burden on the Community 
budget as regards protection of producer~· incomes intervention costs 
and export subsidies and, furthermore, there are no structural s~rpluses 
in maize, 
1. Calls on the Commission of the European Community to amend its proposals 
to the Council CC<l1(85) 700 final> and proposes that the coresponsibi l ity 
levy on maize be lifted; 
2. Calls on its competent committee to draw up an own-initiative repor·t 
on this matter; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission 
and the Council. 
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